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What do conservationists think about markets?  1 
Abstract 2 
The recent history of biodiversity conservation practice has been characterised by the increasing use 3 
of Market-Based Instruments. In seeking to understand this development, an emerging body of 4 
critical social science research tends to characterise conservationists as being ideologically in favour 5 
of markets in conservation. An alternative possibility is that conservationists pursue market solutions 6 
as a pragmatic response to prevailing political and economic circumstances. In this paper we seek to 7 
establish empirically what a sample of conservation professionals actually think about markets in 8 
conservation. We used Q-methodology, a tool for analysing structure and form within respondents’ 9 
subjective positions. The results show that our respondents are circumspect about the growing use 10 
of markets in conservation. We identify two dominant discourses that we label ‘outcome focused 11 
enthusiasm and ‘ideological scepticism’. Neither of these perspectives indicates strong, or uncritical, 12 
support for market approaches, and the views of our respondents appear to recognise the 13 
limitations of markets both in theory and practice. While there is some difference in views between 14 
the two dominant discourses that we document in this paper, there is considerable convergence 15 
towards a position that we label ‘cautious pragmatism’. We conclude that those studying 16 
conservation need to be cautious about over-generalising the perspectives and values held by 17 
conservation professionals, as there appears to be far less consensus about the adoption of market-18 
led approaches in this sector than has been suggested. Further research could investigate the drivers 19 
of pro-market behaviour at the organisational level given the evident personal scepticism of our 20 
respondents.  21 
 22 
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Biodiversity conservation; markets; commodification; Q methodology; practitioner perspectives; 24 
neoliberalism 25 
 26 
1.1 Introduction 27 
The recent history of biodiversity conservation practice has been characterised by the increasing use 28 
of ‘Market-Based Instruments’ (MBIs) (Büscher et al., 2012; Pirard, 2012). These instruments are 29 
diverse, ranging from long-standing approaches such as nature-based tourism through to newer 30 
innovations such as markets in carbon emissions permits. The precise definition of MBIs and the 31 
extent to which they are truly market-based remains contentious, but they are united by the 32 
common characteristic that “a price is attributed to nature” (Pirard, 2012; p62). MBIs are expected 33 
to deliver a range of benefits for conservation, including: new sources of funding (e.g. Balmford and 34 
Whitten, 2003; Ferraro, 2001; Wunder, 2007); an expectation of efficiency achieved through the 35 
market by processes of commodification, trade and competition (Brockington and Duffy, 2011; 36 
Pirard, 2012); and the promotion of an economic rationale for conservation that decision makers will 37 
take seriously (Pearce and Barbier, 2000; Costanza et al., 1997; Daily, 1997). 38 
The practice of market-based conservation has resulted in new, and in some cases radically altered, 39 
relationships between conservation actors, the private sector, governments and local people. For 40 
example, whereas until the late 20th Century mainstream conservation NGOs were often actively 41 
hostile to corporate interests (MacDonald, 2010), partnerships between these actors are now very 42 
common, and indeed central to much conservation practice (MacDonald, 2011). Some even argue 43 
that market-based conservation has become so firmly embedded in the contemporary practice of 44 
conservation that it can be seen as a form of orthodoxy (e.g. Igoe et al., 2010). 45 
The growing significance of market-based conservation has not gone unnoticed by scholars, and the 46 
last few years have seen a rapidly emerging body of critical social science research that seeks to 47 
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understand this development (reviewed by Büscher et al., 2012). From this perspective, the rising 48 
prominence of market-based conservation can be understood as part of a broader political 49 
economic process of neoliberalisation, in which an ever-growing range of activities are brought 50 
within the sphere of markets (Castree, 2008; Igoe and Brockington, 2007). Scholars have identified a 51 
range of potential problems with ‘neoliberal conservation’. These include the impacts of market-52 
based conservation on less powerful actors such as local people (Dressler and Roth, 2011), the 53 
questionable logic of using markets to solve problems that are arguably of their own making and 54 
that MBIs might legitimise further exploitation of nature (Kosoy and Corbera, 2010), and the 55 
possibility that MBIs in conservation are ‘anti-political’, technical fixes to what are essentially 56 
political problems (Büscher, 2010). These views were clearly dominant at the recent Nature Inc. 57 
conference in the Hague (2011)1 and captured in a special issue of Development and Change under 58 
the same title (Arsel and Büscher, 2012). They were also a prominent aspect of recent debate and 59 
controversy over ‘The Green Economy’ at the Rio + 20 summit in June 2012, with developing country 60 
and NGO critics of this approach articulating similar reservations, and expressing the risk that 61 
markets and economic mechanisms might undermine alternative ways of achieving sustainable 62 
development (Doran et al., 2012). 63 
Whilst the growth in market-based conservation is undeniable, relatively little research attention has 64 
been given to what conservationists themselves actually think about this approach. On one hand, it 65 
has been suggested that conservationists (and specifically conservation biologists) have strongly 66 
embraced the market logic and are in general (perhaps unthinkingly) ‘pro-markets’ (Büscher, 2008). 67 
This view appears to be shared by many critical social scientists studying conservation. For example, 68 
Roth & Dressler (2012) in the introduction to a recent special issue of this journal on Market-69 
Oriented Conservation Governance describe “the unquestioning faith an ever-growing number of 70 
agencies, organizations and people have come to place in valuing nature for the sake of financing 71 
conservation and supporting livelihoods.” (p365). Likewise Büscher et al. (2012) claim that 72 
                                                          
1
 This conference was attended by two of the authors of this paper (CS & JF). 
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“neoliberal solutions in conservation appear as a consensus, and dissent is rarely visible” (p.15). They 73 
argue that this is “because neoliberal conservation functions as an ideology, becoming socially (and 74 
ecologically) embedded through generating the hegemonic governance structures and practices 75 
through which it is reproduced” (p.15).  76 
On the other hand, critical views of market-based conservation can also be found outside the 77 
community of scholars represented at the Nature Inc. event, including among those who might 78 
consider themselves conservationists. McCauley (2006) wrote of the danger that “selling out on 79 
nature” (p27) by turning it into tradable commodities would undermine ethical and moral 80 
arguments for conservation2. Ehrlich and Pringle consider that subjecting ecosystems to market 81 
conditions in capitalist economies would “ensure their eventual diminution and demise” (2008; p. 82 
11583). Likewise the ecological economist Richard Norgaard (2010) argues that market metaphors 83 
around ecosystem services are useful heuristic tools to make the case for conservation, but that 84 
mobilising the metaphor into actual market instruments is deeply problematic. These examples 85 
suggest that a range of views on market-based conservation are likely to exist within the 86 
conservation community, which is itself highly heterogeneous in terms of values (Sandbrook et al., 87 
2010). 88 
So what is going on here? Is there a pro-market consensus among conservationists as suggested by 89 
the critical social science discourse, or, as Redford (2011) has suggested, is this view an example of 90 
the “generalisations made by social scientists about conservation that are incorrect or incomplete” 91 
(p.326)? Our aim in this paper is to shed some empirical light on this question by analysing the views 92 
held by a range of ‘mainstream’ conservationists on the role of market based instruments in 93 
conservation. We carried out this study using Q-methodology, a tool for analysing structure and 94 
form within respondents’ subjective positions (Dryzek and Berejikian, 1993; McKeown and Thomas, 95 
1998). We begin the paper with a more detailed literature review of the role of markets in 96 
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 The philosopher Michael Sandel (2012) makes a similar argument, albeit not from an environmental 
perspective 
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conservation, discussing elements of rationale and practice. We then explain Q-methodology, and its 97 
application to delegates at the Society for Conservation Biology annual congress in 2011. The results 98 
demonstrate that although a cautiously pragmatic ‘pro-markets’ perspective is clearly shared by our 99 
respondents, they also hold other more critical perspectives, suggesting that they have not 100 
unquestioningly and universally embraced the logic of markets.  101 
 102 
2.1 Debates about markets in conservation  103 
2.1.1 Markets in theory 104 
Arguments are often made for market instruments using a logic based on the following sequence. 105 
Neoclassical economics starts by suggesting that environmental problems arise due to a divergence 106 
between the private and social costs and benefits of particular activities, characterised as 107 
externalities. This results in an inefficient allocation of resources, as exchange and prices reflect 108 
private costs and benefits, and therefore fail to reflect social values and scarcity (Coase, 1960; Pigou, 109 
1920). Solutions to the externality problem include regulation, the use of taxation, or market-based 110 
instruments, but economists have shown that market instruments can be the least cost way of 111 
achieving desired environmental goals (Baumol and Oates, 1988; Pearce and Turner, 1990).  112 
A special case of the externality problem is where resources are not controlled by private owners, 113 
and are managed as (non-rival and non-excludable) public goods, resulting in degradation and 114 
undersupply (Myers, 1996; Pearce and Barbier, 2000). In order to better reflect social values in 115 
decision making about public goods, economic valuation of the non-market values of environmental 116 
goods and services is advocated, to balance them against other policy objectives (Costanza et al., 117 
1997; Daily, 1997; MEA, 2005; Myers, 1996; Pearce and Barbier, 2000; Turner et al., 2003), and 118 
ultimately, to secure their supply. The logic follows that, if not economically valued, environmental 119 
goods and services will be assigned a default value of zero (Pearce and Barbier, 2000; Sukhdev, 120 
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2008). While valuation need not be associated with trading and the use of markets (Costanza, 2006; 121 
Reid et al., 2006), MBIs are often advocated following the logic laid out above, as the means for 122 
capturing non-market values in order to ensure the supply of environmental goods and services.  123 
Yet, critical scholars commonly do not subscribe to this logic, instead attributing environmental 124 
problems to the spread of market norms and mechanisms, particularly through the process of 125 
neoliberalisation (O'Neill, 2007; Sullivan, 2006). David Harvey characterises neoliberalism as a 126 
political project to restore, renew and expand conditions for capital accumulation, maintaining the 127 
power of economic elites (in Heynen et al., 2007; cf. O'Neill, 2007). In this framing, markets in 128 
conservation could be seen as a way of developing novel commodities as new vehicles for facilitating 129 
the process of capital accumulation (Robertson, 2006).  130 
As well as these generalised concerns about their philosophical basis and underlying worldview, 131 
strong resistance to the use of MBIs in conservation stems from fundamental concerns about the 132 
processes of valuation and commodification (Büscher et al., 2012; Global Forest Coalition, 2006; 133 
Sullivan, 2006). While proponents of valuation distinguish valuation from commodification (e.g. 134 
Costanza, 2006; Reid et al., 2006), opponents tend to equate these processes.  As regards valuation, 135 
critics question whether value in the environment can be adequately expressed in monetary terms, 136 
or whether these are incommensurable. Vatn (2000) suggests that the environment has previously 137 
escaped pricing because ethical aspects are ascribed to it which cannot be adequately or 138 
appropriately priced. Sagoff (2004, 2008) argues that the market price (value in exchange) of ES 139 
differs significantly from their use value (the benefit they provide); in addition, markets will 140 
inevitably ascribe different values than scientific valuation (Sagoff, 2011). Yet, despite these debates, 141 
Adams and Redford regard the emphasis on monetary value a ‘fact of life’ in policy (2010). Whilst 142 
ecological economists (e.g. Fisher et al., 2008) tend to argue, in line with the MA (2005), that 143 
monetary values can be incorporated alongside other values (e.g. ethical or scientific) in decision-144 
making, some authors actually frame this in terms of a trade-off, whereby reliance on monetary 145 
7 
 
values erodes other values (e.g. Martinez-Alier, 2009; O'Neill, 2007). Martinez-Alier’s work 146 
articulates this as the reductive approach of valuation and cost-benefit analysis degrading the 147 
legitimacy of ‘human rights, collective territorial rights, sacredness, ecological, and aesthetic values’ 148 
(2009). Rather than monetary valuation, many advocate deliberation in public policy, for the explicit 149 
acknowledgement of decisions as moral or political, rather than solely economic (McCauley, 2006; 150 
O'Neill, 2007; Sagoff, 2004; Sandel, 2012).  151 
Commodification3, a process associated with the concept of ecosystem services, involves separation, 152 
both between services themselves, and between services and their ecological production (Norgaard, 153 
2010). Kosoy and Corbera (2010) invoke Marx’s notion of commodity fetishism, through which the 154 
processes producing commodities (in Marx’s conceptualisation, labour, here ecosystem functioning) 155 
are masked in the commodity. For critical scholars, this tends to be seen as antithetical to an 156 
ecological worldview and an holistic approach to nature, because integrity and wholeness are 157 
important elements of intrinsic value (Robinson, 2011). 158 
Beyond these arguments about valuation and commodification, advocates of MBIs make specific 159 
claims about the cost effectiveness of market-based approaches to achieve desired environmental 160 
goals (Baumol and Oates, 1988). Pearce and Barbier (2000) promote the increasing adoption of 161 
market-based instruments, as more flexible and efficient than regulatory approaches, in order to 162 
deliver environmental improvements. Others highlight additional benefits, that MBIs promote 163 
transparency of information and clarity of land tenure (Bishop, 2008).  164 
Another key rationale in an age of western government austerity is the expectation of efficient use 165 
of limited funding (Albers and Ferraro, 2006; Ferraro, 2001). Whilst generalised claims are made 166 
about the efficient nature of MBIs, particular market-based instruments encompass specific claims. 167 
                                                          
3
 We adopt Prudham's (2008) definition of commodification: ‘interlinked processes whereby: 
production for use is systematically displaced by production for exchange; social consumption and 
reproduction increasingly relies on purchased commodities; new classes of goods and services are 
made available in the commodity-form; and money plays an increasing role in mediating exchange as 
a common currency of value.’  
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Ferraro (2001) made a seminal case for targeted, direct payments, with specific claim to efficient 168 
performance if these were conditional on conservation performance (now, more commonly known 169 
as Payments for Ecosystem Services, PES). These are expected to circumvent the inefficiency and 170 
inadequate targeting of integrated approaches, which are often only indirectly linked to 171 
environmental performance (Ferraro, 2001; Ferraro and Kiss, 2002; Wunder, 2007). 172 
The conservation community also appears to be strongly motivated by pragmatism in the use of 173 
market instruments. The philosophy of environmental pragmatism combines intrinsic and 174 
instrumental values for nature (Sandbrook et al., 2010). This approach does not display close 175 
adherence to traditional conservation doctrines (Miller et al., 2011), but applies certain values 176 
according to the context (Robinson, 2011). Hence, in an era of the expansion of MBIs in public policy 177 
(Sandel, 2012), the use of markets in conservation is perceived by many practitioners to be politically 178 
expedient, and to deepen beneficial partnerships with private sector actors that have enormous 179 
power to deliver, or to undermine, conservation objectives (Robinson, 2012). 180 
2.1.2 Markets in practice 181 
We turn now to focus more directly on practical implications of the use of markets. This is a difficult 182 
subject about which to generalise because, firstly,  a remarkable range of interventions are referred 183 
to as market based instruments (reviewed by Muradian et al. 2012; Pirard, 2012), and secondly, 184 
many of their local implications depend closely on contextual factors, aspects of the society in which 185 
they are used, and the process through which they are implemented. Yet broadly, advocates 186 
promote market mechanisms as empowering, and critics commonly characterise them as 187 
exploitative. However, it is worth noting that debates about markets often occur at the level of 188 
rationale, being more ideological than practical in character, and few bear much reference to 189 
empirical work.  190 
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Whilst many aspects of markets are highly contested, authors from various backgrounds display 191 
concern about the dynamic qualities of markets, suggesting that inherent ‘flux’ (McCauley, 2006), 192 
and temperamental characteristics (Chan et al., 2007) will not serve conservation (cf. Ehrlich and 193 
Pringle, 2008). McCauley illustrates the implications for conservation with a Costa Rican example, 194 
showing that pollination service values, and ultimately forest survival, were dependent on volatile 195 
coffee prices (2006).  When coffee prices crashed, the area was replanted with pineapple, not 196 
requiring pollination, which rendered forest pollination services worthless.  197 
In terms of how they are manifest in local situations in the developing world, markets are often 198 
promoted on the basis that they can contribute to local livelihoods, in return for the provision of 199 
(environmental) goods or services. Advocates highlight the element of voluntarism associated with 200 
markets, that people can engage on their own terms, choosing, for instance, whether or not to 201 
accept a price (Pagiola et al., 2005). Yet, critics characterise this perspective as blind to political 202 
realities and social context (Granovetter, 1985), highlighting for instance that social norms, coercion, 203 
and the perceived non-monetary benefits of engagement with markets, undermine the perceived 204 
freedom of participants to accept (or reject) a price (e.g. see variety of motivations for engagement 205 
in PES, in e.g.  Fisher, 2012; Kosoy et al., 2008; Milne and Adams, 2012; Van Hecken and Bastiaensen, 206 
2010). There are also concerns about what natural resources local people may have to forego in 207 
engaging with MBIs, with possible limits on access and use (Beymer-Farris and Bassett, 2012; 208 
Fairhead et al., 2012), with potentially the most significant implications for the poorest, whose 209 
property rights may be least secure. This points to a more general critique that market mechanisms 210 
may have inequitable outcomes, as they tend to enhance, rather than challenge, the existing 211 
distribution of power and resources, making them blunt instruments as regards distributional and 212 
procedural equity (Corbera et al., 2007). Further concerns are raised in relation to the introduction 213 
of cash into communities with little experience of the market economy (Wunder, 2007), and the 214 
expectations and shifts these precipitate, including for norms of environmental management, 215 
potentially changing motivations from an intrinsic to extrinsic basis (Corbera et al., 2007; Fisher, 216 
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2012; Gomez-Baggethun et al., 2010; Pattanayak et al., 2010; Sommerville et al., 2009; Van Hecken 217 
and Bastiaensen, 2010).  218 
These debates about the moral and practical considerations of markets and their use in conservation 219 
frame the context for this paper. We empirically investigate the ways in which these debates are 220 
reflected in the perspectives of conservation professionals and academics, and discuss what these 221 
grounded findings suggest for the intellectual discourse that we have reviewed here. The next 222 
section introduces the methods used in this study, before a description of our detailed results and 223 
their implications.  224 
3.1 Methods 225 
3.1.1 What is Q and what does it do? 226 
Q methodology is growing in popularity as a method for exploring the structure and form within and 227 
between subjective opinions and discourses (Dryzek and Berejikian, 1993; McKeown and Thomas, 228 
1998; Watts and Stenner, 2012). The method has found increasing application to conservation and 229 
environmental research in recent years (e.g. Brannstrom, 2011; Robbins, 2000, 2006; López-i-Gelats 230 
et al. 2009). It combines the qualitative study of perceptions with the statistical rigour of 231 
quantitative techniques (McKeown and Thomas, 1998; Watts and Stenner, 2012). Q supports an 232 
understanding of the detailed composition of positions, making it suitable for our aim to understand 233 
the perspectives of conservation professionals. It is designed for use with small numbers of 234 
participants (McKeown and Thomas, 1998) and supports the understanding of how subjective 235 
positions are shared by people, rather than with their prevalence in a population, which 236 
conventional surveys test.  237 
Q methodology requires respondents to arrange statements drawn from the public discourse onto a 238 
grid such as that shown in Figure 1. All respondents use the same statements and complete the grid 239 
according to their relative positions on the statements, from ‘agree most strongly’ to ‘disagree most 240 
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strongly’. To reflect the fact that respondents are likely to most strongly agree or disagree with a 241 
relatively small number of statements, grids used in Q methodology follow an approximately normal 242 
distribution (Watts and Stenner, 2012). The Q grid for our study was relatively flat, with a range from 243 
+4 to -4, following recommendations for topics of comparatively high controversy, and survey 244 
respondents who are familiar with the issues (Brown, 1980; Watts and Stenner, 2012). 245 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 246 
3.1.2 The Q sample (statements) 247 
A Q study starts with identification of the range of perspectives that exist among the respondent 248 
population on a given issue. This is used to derive a ‘concourse’ of statements capturing this range of 249 
perspectives. We constructed a Q concourse of statements relating to perspectives on the role of 250 
markets in conservation, using a combination of literature review, interview data (derived from an 251 
author’s PhD study (2011)) and our own experience of extensive interactions with conservation 252 
practitioners and scholars. These plural approaches captured a wide range of perspectives. Through 253 
this process we identified a set of perspectives that included many of the topical issues in the debate 254 
about markets and conservation identified in the previous section, including questions of ethics, 255 
pragmatism, ideology and local impacts. From this ’concourse’, we removed redundant statements 256 
and further selected statements for conciseness, clear positioning, and ones to which participants 257 
could respond effectively, leaving a list of 34 statements, the final Q sample. This number of 258 
statements works well in Q studies (Fisher and Brown, 2009; Sandbrook et al., 2010), being 259 
cognitively manageable for respondents.  The statements were tested in a pilot study with two  260 
respondents known to the authors. Following the pilot some statements were altered slightly for 261 
clarity or to reverse their polarity, to give a relatively balanced sample.  262 
3.1.3 The Q participants 263 
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Our Q survey was conducted with participants drawn from delegates at the 25th International 264 
Congress for Conservation Biology (ICCB), held in Auckland between the 5th and 9th December 265 
2011. This congress is the main international event run by the Society for Conservation Biology, “an 266 
international professional organization dedicated to promoting the scientific study of the 267 
phenomena that affect the maintenance, loss, and restoration of biological diversity” 268 
(http://www.conbio.org/AboutUs/). The event attracts several thousand delegates from around the 269 
world, including academics and practitioners. This event was chosen as it was our intention to 270 
capture the views of the conservation ‘mainstream’, including academics and major practitioner 271 
NGOs. The ICCB is well attended by this community, and is widely recognised as the most important 272 
academic conference of conservation biology. It has also been the direct focus of critique regarding 273 
the adoption of neoliberal market-conservation by the conservation community (Büscher, 2008). 274 
That said, we recognise that the SCB congress delegates provide a partial view of the conservation 275 
universe, and future research using different sampling strategies would be valuable.  276 
CS attended the congress and carried out face to face interviews with respondents, during which 277 
they completed the Q survey. Respondents were selected purposively with the deliberate intention 278 
of capturing a wide-range of different views that were present among those attending the congress. 279 
To do this CS approached delegates, explained the nature of the research topic and ascertained 280 
through an informal conversation whether they had a strong view on the research topic. If they did 281 
the individual was asked to complete the survey. If they did not have a strong view or expertise on 282 
the subject, the respondent was not asked to participate in the survey. This approach continued 283 
throughout the congress, until CS felt that a sufficiently wide range of different viewpoints had been 284 
captured. Ten respondents were interviewed on site during the congress, and a further two were 285 
identified at the congress but then interviewed by CS in the UK after the event. Q method aims to 286 
establish the existence of and explain particular viewpoints, and does not allow inferences to be 287 
drawn about the prevalence of such viewpoints within a wider population. It is therefore 288 
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appropriate to use a small but targeted sample, and the standard factor analysis logic of larger 289 
samples being ‘better’ does not apply (Watts and Stenner, 2012).  290 
Our sample included one former and four current employees of large international conservation 291 
organisations, one social entrepreneur, one employee of an animal welfare organisation, one 292 
government advisor and four academics, of whom two were conservation scientists and two 293 
economists. Eight were male and four female. All the respondents were from Organisation for 294 
Economic Co-operation and Development countries. The large international conservation 295 
organisations from which staff members were interviewed are all involved in a number of market-296 
based conservation activities. Respondents were promised anonymity, and were asked to present 297 
their own views rather than those of their organisation. Permission to conduct the survey was 298 
obtained in advance from the organisers of the ICCB. 299 
3.1.4 The interviews 300 
All interviews were conducted in a quiet place away from other people. After an initial explanation 301 
of the project and the method, respondents completed the Q survey, during which they sorted the 302 
statements onto the grid. Statements were presented in a random order that was different for each 303 
respondent. Respondents were encouraged to speak during the sort to explain the rationale behind 304 
their choices. Where respondents were confused or had questions about statements, CS gave 305 
limited help to explain the meaning of the statement whilst aiming not to introduce bias into the 306 
respondent’s perspective about it. No formal definition of markets or other terms were provided, as 307 
we wanted respondents to draw on their own understanding of the concepts (Watts and Stenner, 308 
2012). After the survey was completed, respondents were asked to explain what personal 309 
experience or ideas they had been drawing on when completing the Q-sort. This was intended to 310 
encourage open answers about where views came from and the logic behind the responses. CS 311 
wrote notes on the qualitative component of the interviews, including verbatim quotes that were 312 
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considered particularly important. These qualitative data were then used to help with the 313 
interpretation of the results.  314 
Respondents were not constrained to follow the forced normal distribution shown on the grid, 315 
although they were encouraged to follow the normal distribution as closely as possible. Various 316 
sources suggest that forcing a normal distribution is not necessary from a statistical point of view. 317 
However, encouraging respondents to follow the distribution as far as possible is a practical way of 318 
encouraging them to prioritise each statement relative to others (Barry and Proops, 2000; Brown, 319 
1980; McKeown and Thomas, 1998; Watts and Stenner, 2012). Five of the twelve respondents did 320 
not exactly follow the normal distribution shown on the Q grid.  321 
3.1.5 Q analysis 322 
Q sorts were analysed using PQMethod software. Once participants have completed the sort, Q 323 
analysis involves three statistical procedures used in sequence: correlation, factor analysis and 324 
computation of factor scores (Watts and Stenner, 2012). Factor analysis seeks correlations between 325 
variables, to reduce a multivariate dataset to a small number of dimensions, called ‘factors’ (Watts 326 
and Stenner, 2012). Rotation of a specified number of factors helps their definition by eliminating 327 
‘noise’ from sorts which load significantly on more than one factor and thus distinctly define none 328 
(Wolf, 2006). This modifies statistically significant factors and relates them more closely to the 329 
associated Q sorts (Barry and Proops, 2000).  330 
We rotated two, three, four and five factors, and compared the results to determine the most 331 
appropriate number of factors to interpret. We chose two factors to analyse and interpret, 332 
according to the following criteria: 1) the Eigenvalue should be greater than or equal to 1 (the Kaiser-333 
Guttman criterion described by Watts and Stenner 2012) and 2) there should be at least 2 Q-sorts 334 
with significant factor loadings for each factor (Brown (1980). In the three factor solution the third 335 
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factor had an Eigenvalue greater than one (1.0201) but only one Q-sort loaded significantly onto one 336 
of the factors. The two factor solution was therefore the focus of our interpretations. 337 
Following rotation, PQMethod automatically ‘flags’ Q sorts to associate them with particular factors. 338 
These figures are ‘factor loadings’, effectively correlation coefficients indicating the degree to which 339 
each Q sort relates to each factor (Watts and Stenner, 2012). PQMethod generates outputs for each 340 
factor, including an ‘ideal-type’ Q sort which represents the common ordering of statements for Q 341 
sorts associated with this factor. The interpretation centres on these ideal-type Q sorts. Definitive 342 
statements (marked with an asterisk) are statements that particular factors rank significantly 343 
differently to all other factors (Watts and Stenner 2012).  344 
At this stage, the analysis becomes less technical and more interpretive of the factors (Eden et al., 345 
2005), understood through the ideal-type Q sorts, to understand the meaning displayed in the 346 
relative placement of statements. Factors can be interpreted as discourses: ‘shared way[s] of 347 
apprehending the world’ (Dryzek, 2005). We discussed the ideal type Q sorts in light of our 348 
understanding of existing viewpoints on the research topic, and wrote narrative descriptions of each 349 
factor, supported by direct quotes from respondents associated with the factor and statement 350 
scores for the factor. These descriptions are presented as results, although we recognise that this 351 
analysis is somewhat subjective (Eden et al., 2005), and we encourage the reader to look at the 352 
statistical results and carry out their own interpretation. 353 
4.1 Results  354 
 355 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 356 
 357 
4.1.1 Points of Consensus: 358 
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The results demonstrate a relatively high level of consensus across the full set of respondents (Table 359 
1). In the two factor solution 14 of the 34 statements are ‘consensus statements’ (those which are 360 
not statistically distinguishable between factors)4. These statements suggest a degree of cautious 361 
pragmatism about the use of markets in conservation amongst our respondents. This consensus is 362 
based both on scepticism about the underlying rationales for market-based conservation and on the 363 
ways that markets operate in practice. It is important to note that the strongest positively and 364 
negatively ranked statements for both Factor solutions were consensus statements, indicating 365 
significant shared ground between all of our respondents.  366 
In terms of underlying rationales for the use of markets, there was strong disagreement with the 367 
argument that biodiversity that can’t survive in the marketplace is not worth conserving (Statement 368 
10; Score -4)5, and strong agreement that choices about conservation should be ethical and political 369 
and not solely economic (26; +4). Respondents felt that there is a difference between traditional 370 
commodity markets and ecosystem services markets (16; -2). There was a shared view that it was 371 
wrong to argue that opponents of markets were not living in the real world (14; Factor One -2, 372 
Factor Two -3). Indeed, one respondent from Factor Two expressed frustration with opponents of 373 
markets being seen as “airy fairy tree huggers” (Respondent 3).  374 
In relation to the operation of markets for conservation in practice, there was strong agreement that 375 
they are most effective when directly linked to the delivery of conservation outcomes (7; Factor One 376 
+4, Factor Two +3), but also a shared desire for more evidence on the impacts of such approaches 377 
before these were more widely adopted (24; +1). There was shared concern about the impacts of 378 
markets for local people where they have limited experience of them (28; +1), and a rejection of the 379 
view that as engaging in markets is voluntary they cannot be exploitative (30; Factor One -4, Factor 380 
                                                          
4
 This consensus seems stable across solutions with different numbers of factors. For example, the 
four factor solution generated ten consensus statements 
5
 Note that reporting of statement content will take this form (statement number; Factor score). Refer 
to Table 1 to see the full statement.  
17 
 
Two -3). One respondent from Factor One said “things like PES are meant to be voluntary, but I 381 
guess in practice social coercion is an issue” (Respondent 4).  382 
A further six statements showed a consensus of opinion around the midpoint of the distribution. 383 
These included statements about the relationship between markets and local inequality (29; 0), 384 
conservation and neoliberalism (20; Factor One 0, Factor Two -1), and the novelty of the market 385 
based approach (18; Factor One -1, Factor Two 0).  Respondents did not express strong feelings 386 
about conditionality as a reason to use markets (6; Factor One 0, Factor Two -1), the risk of artificial 387 
substitutes outcompeting nature in providing ecosystem services (27; 0) or the impact of markets on 388 
livelihood opportunities for the poor (31; Factor One 2, Factor Two 0).  389 
4.1.2 Factor One – Outcome focused enthusiasm 390 
Despite the considerable consensus between the factors, Factor One is clearly distinguished from 391 
Factor Two in having a relatively more optimistic view of the role of markets in conservation (Table 392 
1). It is focused on the most effective ways of securing conservation outcomes given current 393 
conditions. Seven respondents were associated with this factor, including two employees of large 394 
international conservation organisations, one government advisor and all four academics, of whom 395 
two were conservation scientists and two economists.  396 
In terms of underlying rationales for the use of markets, respondents associated with Factor One 397 
believe, with declining strength of feeling, that markets provide a new (1*, +3), large (2*, +2) and 398 
sustainable (3*, +1) source of funding, and indeed that sufficient funding for conservation requires 399 
markets (4*, -3). From this viewpoint, markets can be restructured to deliver conservation outcomes 400 
(17*, -3). As a result, conservation organisations should promote the economic valuation of nature 401 
(21*, +2), support the commodification of nature (22*, -2) and embrace the market rather than fight 402 
against it (8*, +1). They felt that pricing nature does not detract from other values (25*, +3), and that 403 
decision makers understand monetary values (13*, +1). One respondent suggested that the idea of 404 
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valuing nature had been around for 20 years or so and “shouldn’t concern us if we communicate it 405 
correctly” (Respondent 4). For this respondent what was novel were “the policy measures and actual 406 
markets”.  407 
In relation to the operation of markets for conservation in practice, respondents associated with 408 
Factor One believe, with declining strength of feeling, that they create local conservation incentives 409 
(33*, +3), that actors find beneficial outcomes by engaging in them (19*, +2), and they do not deny 410 
local people access to natural resources (32*, -1). Speaking of the ability of markets to create local 411 
incentives for conservation, Respondent 4 stated that there were “clear case studies of where that 412 
has happened”. Another respondent felt that markets “are more effective than Protected Areas or 413 
other tools” for conservation and livelihoods (Respondent 2)6. Drawing on South African evidence, 414 
Respondent 11 stated that “wildlife based market mechanisms have had positive conservation 415 
outcomes” (Respondent 11). 416 
The respondents associated with this factor do not see markets as too unpredictable for 417 
conservation purposes (11*, -2) and feel they are in turn capable of handling the unpredictable 418 
qualities of ecosystems (23*, -1). This demonstrates a managerial attitude to nature. They feel that 419 
partnerships with the private sector do not undermine conservation (15*, -3) or constrain the ability 420 
of conservationists to express concerns about market-based conservation (34*, -1). An overall 421 
position of pragmatism emerges (12*, -1), characterised by Respondent 2’s view that conservation 422 
should “leverage” rather than “embrace” markets.  423 
 424 
4.1.3 Factor Two – Ideological scepticism: 425 
Factor Two is distinguished from Factor One in having a more ideological scepticism of the 426 
underlying rationale for market-based conservation (Table 1). Where respondents associated with 427 
                                                          
6
 It is interesting to note that Respondent 2 clearly considered market-based conservation and 
protected areas to be mutually exclusive.  
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Factor One felt that practical possibilities of using markets to deliver conservation outcomes 428 
overcame their caution (as expressed in the consensus statements), those associated with Factor 429 
Two were not similarly persuaded. Respondents associated with this Factor included one former and 430 
two present employees of large international conservation organisations, one social entrepreneur 431 
and one employee of an animal welfare organisation.  432 
In terms of the underlying rationale for the use of markets, respondents associated with this factor 433 
felt that putting a price on nature detracts from other values (25, -4), and felt that conservation 434 
organisations should not promote economic valuation (21, -3) or commodification of nature (22, +4). 435 
These three matters of principle were the strongest points of disagreement between Factors 1 and 436 
2. For these respondents the argument that conservation should be framed in monetary terms in 437 
order to be legible to decision makers is not convincing (13, -2), with Respondent 6 stating that 438 
“Economic valuation to raise awareness is highly dangerous”. Respondents associated with this 439 
factor felt that biodiversity loss is primarily driven by market capitalism (9, +3) and that therefore 440 
conservation should not embrace the market (8, -2), especially since markets cannot be restructured 441 
sufficiently to deliver conservation outcomes (17, +2). This viewpoint characterises markets as the 442 
underlying problem for conservation and not therefore usefully part of the solution, as captured by 443 
Respondent 9’s statements that “commodification of biodiversity is happening and that is why we 444 
are losing it” and “we will lose the biodiversity of the planet because we are chasing capitalism”. 445 
Respondents associated with this Factor also identified fundamental problems with the 446 
characteristics of markets for conservation. They felt that markets cannot handle the unpredictable 447 
properties of ecosystems (23, +3), and are themselves too unpredictable for conservation purposes 448 
(11, +2). If the use of markets involved private sector partnerships, these were seen as problematic 449 
because they undermine conservation outcomes (15, +1) and make it more difficult for 450 
conservationists to express concerns about market-based conservation (34, +2). As a result, 451 
pragmatism was not seen as a good enough reason to risk using markets (12, +2).  452 
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Respondents associated with this Factor did not express strong views in relation to the actual 453 
operation of markets for conservation in practice. While recognising that non-market sources of 454 
conservation funding are not currently sufficient (4, -1) and that markets do provide a new source of 455 
funding (1, +1), they felt that markets were neither a large (2, -1) nor a sustainable (3, -1) source of 456 
funding. They agreed that markets deny the poor access to natural resources (32, +1). In the words 457 
of Respondent 6; “Because you’re playing with money you are creating new power structures”. They 458 
disagreed that conservation should use markets because they are the most efficient means for 459 
allocating scarce resources (5, -2). This contrasts with the view of Respondent 11 (Factor One) who 460 
felt that some publicly funded projects were a “nightmarish waste of money” and that “a property of 461 
the market” is to identify better solutions.  462 
5.1 Markets and conservationists: a complex relationship 463 
These results suggest that our sample of conservation professionals and academics are somewhat 464 
circumspect about the growing use of markets, and market-like instruments, in the context of 465 
biodiversity conservation, although recent literature on this subject has been considerably more 466 
polarised. The perspectives reported here do not indicate strong, or uncritical, adoption of 467 
neoliberal approaches, and the views of our respondents appear to recognise the limitations of 468 
markets both in theory and practice. While there is some difference in views between the two 469 
dominant discourses that we document in this paper, there is considerable convergence towards a 470 
position that we have characterised as ‘cautious pragmatism’. Given that Q method studies 471 
commonly identify strongly divergent views, the fact that 14 of the 34 statements were ‘consensus 472 
statements’ is striking.  473 
 474 
These findings are of some significance to recent critical social science scholarship, including in a 475 
special issue of this journal on Market-Oriented Conservation Governance. This literature 476 
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characterises conservation professionals as far less critical, and ready to embrace the logic of 477 
markets and the underlying tenets of neoliberalism with little dissent. Interestingly, many of these 478 
critiques are based on trying to understand organisational (not individual) perspectives, and 479 
potentially over-simplify the views of conservation scientists and practitioners in order to make what 480 
are often valid, and strong, theoretical points about the limitations of markets. While accepting the 481 
important points made by these critical scholars and recognising that Q method provides a more 482 
superficial method with different emphases when compared to ethnographic methods, this paper 483 
departs from this previous work by empirically investigating the views that conservation 484 
professionals hold, and attempts to understand the individual perspectives behind their positions. 485 
What is particularly surprising in our findings is the lack of a strong pro-markets perspective among 486 
our respondents, even though a number of them are associated with organisations that strongly 487 
advocate, and adopt, market-oriented conservation activities. While we are cautious about over-488 
generalising based on the results from this limited empirical exercise, this does indicate a likely 489 
dissonance between the values held by individual employees of large conservation organisations and 490 
the official positions adopted by the organisations themselves. This resonates with earlier work 491 
which has demonstrated that the personal environmental values held by (European) policy advisors 492 
are distinct from their professional environmental policy activities (Craig and Glasser, 1993). Our 493 
respondents participated in our study in a personal capacity, and the results suggest that these 494 
individuals are far more sceptical about markets than the positions articulated by their 495 
organisations. If this is indeed the case, then it raises the interesting question of where the more 496 
‘pro-markets’ stance of organisations comes from. Are senior staff who have the power to dictate 497 
organisational behaviour more personally convinced by arguments for market-based conservation 498 
than our respondents, or are they simply responding to an institutional and funding environment in 499 
which there seems no alternative (Büscher, In Press)? Is such a framing (the lack of alternatives) 500 
itself a reflection of the hegemonic dominance of the ideology of neoliberalism in contemporary 501 
public life, as has been suggested by some of the critical social science literature (Büscher et al., 502 
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2012)? Alternatively, could the adoption of market based approaches be a more prosaic 503 
consequence of close engagements with the corporate sector that were initially motivated by a 504 
desire to promote less environmentally damaging behaviour (as reviewed by Robinson, 2012)? These 505 
will be important questions for future research on this topic.  506 
Our detailed conversations with our respondents while they were completing the Q-survey suggest 507 
some reasons behind this more cautious engagement with market-based conservation. For some, 508 
this had emerged after actually trying and failing to implement market approaches in projects, often 509 
without consciously recognising at the time the neoliberal logics on which these were based. The 510 
frustrations associated with trying to actually make markets for conservation work in practice have 511 
led to a recognition that these interventions do not always follow the logic of neoclassical economics 512 
textbooks. Some of our respondents also expressed some concerns about the ambiguity about what 513 
actually constituted a market, or market-approach, for conservation, reflecting the considerable 514 
heterogeneity of understanding that Pirard (2012) alludes to. For example, Respondent 12 said that 515 
“If it involves payments people assume it is a market – that is just our ignorance as biologists”. 516 
6.1 Conclusion 517 
This paper argues that social science critiques of conservation need to be cautious about over-518 
generalising the extent to which conservation professionals approve of the adoption of neoliberal, 519 
market-led approaches in conservation. Using a sample of conservationists drawn from mainstream 520 
NGOs and academia, we found no such consensus. Our respondents are familiar with many of the 521 
limitations that critics of market-based conservation identify, often as an outcome of practical 522 
implementation. Indeed, while they seem less familiar with some of the linguistic and conceptual 523 
framing of these critiques (such as the use of the term ‘neoliberalism’), their cautious pragmatism 524 
seems a more grounded reaction to the messy reality that characterises most conservation projects.  525 
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Q methodology is a powerful approach for identifying value positions with respect to a particular 526 
issue among a group of respondents. However, the results cannot be taken as representative of a 527 
wider population, and nor can they be used to identify what informs perspectives or causes value-528 
action dissonance without more detailed qualitative research. Further exploration of these issues is 529 
needed in order to begin to tackle the deeper question of how conservationists are coming to terms 530 
with market based interventions, and how they frame them within their understanding of the wider 531 
challenges faced by contemporary conservation. Such research might lead to a less polarised debate, 532 
and perhaps even the forging of some common ground between conservation professionals and 533 
their (critical) social science interlocutors. 534 
 535 
 536 
 537 
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Table 1: Idealised Q-sort and z-scores for the two-factor solution 
 
Statement 
Factor 1 
‘outcome-focused 
enthusiasm’ 
Factor 2 
‘ideological 
scepticism’ 
Rank
a
 z-Score Rank
a
 z-Score 
1. Markets provide a new source of funding for 
conservation. 
3* 1.51 1* 0.69 
2. Markets provide a large source of funding for 
conservation.  
2* 0.89 -1* -0.45 
3. Markets provide a sustainable source of funding 
for conservation. 
1* 0.78 -1* -0.39 
4. Sufficient funding to reverse biodiversity loss 
can be raised without turning to markets. 
-3* -1.05 -1* -0.25 
5. Conservation should use markets because they 
are the most efficient means for allocating scarce 
resources. 
0* -0.15 -2* -1.21 
6. Market-based conservation is preferable to 
other forms because it is conditional on 
performance.  
0 0.14 -1 -0.45 
7. Markets are most effective for conservation 
when they are directly linked to the delivery of 
conservation outcomes.  
4 1.54 3 1.3 
8. Conservation should embrace market-based 
capitalism, not fight against it.  
1* 0.51 -2* -1.02 
9. Globally, biodiversity loss is primarily driven by 
market-based capitalism. 
0* 0.08 3* 1 
10. Biodiversity that cannot survive in the 
marketplace is not worth conserving.  
-4 -2.01 -4 -2.16 
11. Markets are too unpredictable to be used for 
conservation purposes. 
-2* -0.8 2* 0.76 
12. Pragmatism is not a strong enough reason for 
conservation to risk the use of market forces. 
-1* -0.71 2* 0.83 
13. Decision makers understand monetary values, 
so conservation should be framed in those terms. 
1* 0.88 -2* -1 
14. Those who oppose market-based conservation 
are not living in the real world. 
-2 -1 -3 -1.52 
15. Conservation partnerships with the private 
sector are undermining conservation outcomes. 
-3* -1.52 1* 0.49 
16. There is no difference between markets for 
traditional commodities and markets for 
ecosystem services. 
-2 -0.97 -2 -0.78 
17. Markets cannot be restructured sufficiently to 
deliver conservation outcomes. 
-3* -1.16 2* 0.71 
18. There is nothing really new about the market-
based approach to conservation. 
-1 -0.58 0 -0.06 
19. By engaging in markets for conservation, 
actors find mutually beneficial outcomes. 
2* 1.04 0* 0.23 
Table 1
20. The expansion of market-based conservation 
has nothing to do with neoliberalism. 
0 -0.18 -1 -0.7 
21. Conservation organisations should promote 
the economic valuation of nature. 
2* 1.08 -3* -1.42 
22. Conservation organisations should not support 
the commodification of nature. 
-2* -0.96 4* 1.48 
23. Markets have no way of dealing with 
unpredictable properties of ecosystems, and this 
makes them dangerous for conservation. 
-1* -0.43 3* 1.4 
24. We need more evidence on the impacts of 
market-based conservation before we go too far.  
1 0.78 1 0.56 
25. Putting a price on nature does not detract 
from all the other reasons to value it. 
3* 1.27 -4* -1.52 
26. Choices about conservation should be 
acknowledged as ethical and political, and not 
presented as solely economic. 
4 1.55 4 1.87 
27. There is a risk that in a market, artificial 
substitutes may become more competitive than 
nature at providing services.  
0 0.15 0 0.22 
28. Market-based conservation has negative social 
impacts in places with limited experience of the 
market economy. 
1 0.16 1 0.43 
29. Market-based conservation increases 
inequality in local communities. 
0 0.1 0 0.43 
30. Market-based conservation transactions are 
voluntary, so there is no possibility for 
exploitation. 
-4 -1.53 -3 -1.29 
31. Market based conservation provides livelihood 
opportunities for the poor. 
2 0.91 0 0.2 
32. Market based conservation denies poor people 
access to natural resources on which they depend. 
-1* -0.71 1* 0.55 
33. Market-based conservation creates local 
incentives to support conservation. 
3* 1.14 0* 0.13 
34. Partnerships with the private sector have 
made it more difficult for conservationists to 
express concerns about market-based 
conservation. 
-1* -0.76 2* 0.92 
 
a
Rank relates to the idealised Q sort position in the survey grid (see Figure 1).  
Distinguishing statements (where p <0.05) are marked with *. Note that by definition in a 2 factor solution, 
distinguishing statements are common to the two factors. Statements that do not distinguish are consensus 
statements. 
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